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CASE COMMENTS
LABOR LAw -PRE-ELECTION STATEMENT OF MAJORITY UNION EXPRES-
SING AN ABSOLUTE AND ARBITRARY REFUSAL To DOVETAIL SENIORITY RIGHTS
IF ELECTED HELD TO VIOLATE SECTION 8(b) (1) (A) of the TAFT-HARTLEY
ACT. -In 1964, Red Ball Motor Freight, a trucking firm located in Shreve-
port, Louisiana, acquired the independent trucking company of Couch Motor
Lines, also located in Shreveport. As a result of this acquisition, the station
operated by Couch was closed, and its former employees were transferred to
Red Ball's terminal, known as Airport Drive. The former Couch employees,
numbering thirty men, were members of Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 568
[hereinafter Teamsters]. After the merger they worked side-by-side at the Air-
port Drive Terminal with the fifty original employees of Red Ball who were
represented by the Union of Transportation Employees [hereinafter UTE]. The
management of Red Ball had met with the officers of the two unions prior to
the consolidation. At that time it was agreed that the company would initiate
representation proceedings to determine which union the majority of the com-
bined employees wished to have represent them. It was also agreed that the
existing contract of the winning union would apply to all of the employees.
Immediately prior to the election, UTE informed its members that if the
Teamsters were elected, the seniority roster would be dovetailed. UTE alleged
to its members that as a result of this action certain UTE members would lose
their jobs. UTE then pledged to its members that, if chosen exclusive bargain-
ing agent, it would never agree to dovetailing, but would protect original UTE
members' seniority against "all others."' The ensuing election and a subsequent
one, held three months later, were set aside on the grounds, inter alia, that the
representations made by UTE had rendered a fair election impossible. The
objections to the second election were consolidated 2 with the Teamster's charge
that the pre-election statements on dovetailing made by UTE violated section 8
(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The NLRB adopted the report of the
trial examiner which concluded that UTE had announced a bargaining policy
with respect to preferential seniority in derogation of a statutory representative's
duty to represent all unit employees fairly.' The Board further agreed with
the trial examiner that this unfair representation by UTE violated section
8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act.' On a petition by the Board to enforce
1 The UTE statement on seniority was contained in a letter sent the day before the
election to all UTE members employed at the Airport Drive Terminal. The letter concluded:
Even if seniority is dovetailed, you know a majority of UTE employees will go
to the bottom of the board should the Teamsters win.
...You can rest assured that the Union of Transportation Employees will
never agree that its members will go to the bottom of any seniority list and that
your seniority will be respected and protected against all others .... This is a plain
statement of the position of the Union of Transportation Employees. Truck Drivers
& Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 140 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
2 The Teamsters also charged that the employer had violated §§ 8(a) (1), (2), and (3)
of the NLRA by its discriminatory policy of assigning overtime. The Board upheld these
charges. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Truck
Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
3 Id. at 1243-46.
4 Id. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat.
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (A) (1964) provides that it shall be an unfair labor
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its cease and desist order, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed and held: a majority union's campaign pledge that, if
elected, it would arbitrarily refuse to dovetail seniority rights, where made solely
in an attempt to secure political power, without any pretense of rational jus-
tification, is an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
The above facts illustrate a problem often encountered in merger situa-
tions.5 When two companies merge, the surviving company is, more often than
not, faced with two plants and two sets of unions. Since one of the prime
motivations for merger is consolidation, the surviving company usually desires
to operate with just one union and possibly one plant. To achieve this end,
the two unions must be combined into one. Ordinarily, this is accomplished
by holding a consent election to eliminate one of the unions. For the numerically
stronger union, one of the best ways to insure victory is to promise its members
that they will be treated better than the members of the minority union. Since
one of the most important rights guaranteed to an employee by his union is
his seniority,' the numerically stronger union may promise its members that,
if elected, it will not enter any agreement to dovetail the minority members'
seniority. Such an adamant stand by the larger union, and the resulting fear
instilled in the minority union over losing their seniority completely, makes a
fair consent election nearly impossible.
The situation in Truck Drivers Local was the typical result of such a "no-
dovetailing" pledge by the majority union, in this case UTE. Two attempts
at holding a fair election had failed. Although Couch and Red Ball had com-
pletely merged into one physical plant, and all the employees worked side-by-
side at similar jobs, thirty of them were represented by the Teamsters and fifty
were represented by UTE. In order to rectify this situation, the NLRB issued
its cease and desist order requiring UTE to retract its adamant refusal to dove-
tail seniority rights.'
In upholding this order, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
used a novel three step approach. First, the court aligned itself with the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Local 12, United Rubber Workers of America v. NLRBs
that a union's violation of its statutory duty of fair representation is an unfair
labor practice under section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The notion
that unfair representation may equal an unfair labor practice was first elaborated
by the NLRB in Miranda Fuel Company.' Basically, the majority of the Board
in Miranda found that the statutory duty of fair representation imposed upon
practice for a labor organization or its agents "to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
5 See generally Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 INDUs. & LAB. REL.
Rny. 361 (1955); Mater & Mangum, The Integration of Seniority Lists in Transportation
Mergers, 16 INDus. & LA. REL. RZ V. 343 (1963).
6 See text accompanying.note 33 infra.
7 Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1238, 1259 (1966), aff'd sub nom.
Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
8 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
9 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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a union by section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)'0 is also
embodied in section 7 of the Act. 1 The Board noted that section 7 guarantees
employees the right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing,"' " and held that this right necessarily encompasses the employees'
right to have their chosen bargaining representative fulfill its duty to act in a
fair and impartial manner. Of course, once the duty of fair representation is
read into section 7, a union that violates this duty is automatically guilty of an
unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1) (A)." On a petition to enforce
the order issued in Miranda, the Second Circuit, by a divided court, refused
to accept this theory.'4 Judge Medina, speaking for the majority, implied that
section 8(b) (1) (A) restricts unions in the same manner that section 8(a) (1)
restricts employers and, therefore, does not apply to arbitrary union treatment
of a member unrelated to his union membership. 5 However, in Local 12,
United Rubber Workers v. NLRB,'6 decided three years later, the Fifth Circuit
"respectfully [declined] to concur in the reasoning of Judge Medina"'7 and
explicitly held that a violation of a union's fair representation duty was an
unfair labor practice under section 8(b(1) (A)." The court in Truck Drivers
Local cited United Rubber Workers for establishing a "firmer acceptance"' 9
of the theory of NLRB jurisdiction over unfair union representation.
Before the decision of the Board in Miranda and the Fifth Circuit in
United Rubber Workers, the traditional forum for an employee allegedly suf-
10 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947),
29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1964) provides that
[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit ....
11 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. 157 (1964) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities ....
12 Id.
13 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963). The Board also found the union guilty of an 8(b) (2) violation.
For a more detailed treatment of Miranda and further aspects of a union's duty of fair
representation, see Aaron, Some Aspects of Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 OHIo
ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VAND. L. Rnv. 547 (1963); Blumrosen, The
Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-
Union Relationship, 61 MicH. L. REv. 1435 (1963); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation,
2 VILL. L. Rxv. 151 (1957); Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective
Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination, 24 MN. L. Rav. 113 (1964); Sovern, Race
Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, in
N.Y.U. 16TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3 (1963); Summers, Individual Rights in
Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 362 (1962); Weiss, Federal
Remedies for Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions 50 GEo. L.J. 457 (1962); Wellington,
Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System 67
YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).
14 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d. 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
15 Id. at 178. See also Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 201 n.37 (1962) (dis-
senting opinion), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Note, Administrative
Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation: The Miranda Case, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 711,
716-25 (1964). See generally authorities cited in note 13 supra.
16 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
17 Id. at 20.
18 Id.
19 Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 141 '(D.C. Cir. 1967).
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fering from union unfair representation had been the courts. This judicial
remedy was first fashioned in Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Com-
pany ° in order to enforce a union's fair representation duty under the Railway
Labor Act, but has since been expanded to include unfair representation under
the NLRA2 The courts have found that a union's statutory right to be the
exclusive bargaining agent for all its members carries with it the corresponding
statutory duty to represent each of them fairly.22
However, the characterization in Miranda and United Rubber Workers
of unfair representation as an unfair labor practice threatened to pre-empt the
courts from exercising their traditional jurisdiction in this area. In San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,23 the Supreme Court had held:
When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor
Relations] Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger
of state interference with national policy is to be averted.
24
In United Rubber Workers the Fifth Circuit considered this problem and was
forced to admit that
[r]ecognition of a breach of the union's duty of fair representation as an
unfair labor practice will have the necessary effect of bringing such con-
troversies within the primary jurisdiction of the Board, thus requiring some
degree of reorientation of current jurisdictional practices.
2 5
This dilemma was recently resolved by the Supreme Court in Vaca v.
Sipes." In Vaca, the respondent employee alleged that his union had violated
its statutory duty of fair representation, and he sought relief in the state
courts of Missouri. The union asserted as a defense the lack of jurisdiction of
state courts. It contended that under the Board's decision in Miranda and the
Fifth Circuit's holding in United Rubber Workers, unfair representation was
arguably an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1) (A), so that state
court action was pre-empted by the Garmon rule. A majority of the Court
refused to accept this argument and held that the pre-emption doctrine does
not apply to cases where it cannot fairly be inferred that the intent of Congress
was to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the NLRB:
[W]e cannot assume from the NLRB's tardy assumption of jurisdiction in
these cases [involving unfair representation] that Congress, when it enacted
N.L.R.A. § 8(b) in 1947, intended to oust the courts of their traditional
20 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
21 Syres v. Oil Workers' Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g per curiam 223 F.2d 739 (5th
Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
22 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). This statutory
right of exclusive representation is incorporated into the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
23 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
24 Id. at 245.
25 Local 12, United Rubber Workers of America v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 21 (5th Cir.
1966).
26 87 S. Ct. 903 (1967).
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jurisdiction to curb arbitrary conduct by the individual employee's statu-
atory representative.
27
The Vaca opinion was cited by the court in Truck Drivers Local as implicit
Supreme Court affirmation of the doctrine of NLRB jurisdiction over unfair
labor representation.28 Judge McGowan, author of the opinion in Truck
Drivers Local, stated that Vaca "assumed in terms the validity of the doctrine,"29
basing his conclusion on the ground that
[a] necessary premise of the majority's statement that Labor Board jurisdic-
tion in such cases does not exclude court relief was its explicit assumption
that unfair representation is an unfair labor practice20
While it is true that the Vaca Court only "[assumed] for present purposes""1
that union unfair representation was a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A), the
fact remains that an elaborate decision was based on the probable validity of
Board jurisdiction.2 Thus, drawing support from the Board's Miranda deci-
sion, United Rubber Workers, and an interpretive reading of the Supreme
Court's decision in Vaca, the circuit court in Truck Drivers Local expressly
adopted the theory that unfair representation is an unfair labor practice under
8(b) (1) (A) and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
In the second step of its opinion, the court determined that a union's
arbitrary and adamant refusal to dovetail its seniority rosters is an instance of
unfair representation, and thus, under the Miranda rationale, is also a violation
of section 8(b) (1) (A). In reaching this conclusion, Judge McGowan had to
balance two fundamental interests: (1) the individual employee's right to
seniority; and (2) the union's right to negotiate a settlement for the good of
all its members. The importance of seniority to an employee can hardly be
overestimated. It is his major form of job security in that it often determines
who gets or keeps an available job.2 Nevertheless, the courts have recognized
that an individual's rights are not always supreme. The union must be and is
allowed a certain degree of flexibility in bargaining, especially in the negotia-
tion stages.34
The NLRB itself has only recently begun to "articulate the characteristics
of unfair representation. . . ."" Hence, in order to decide if a refusal to dove-
27 Id. at 913.
28 Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 141-42 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
29 Id. at 141-42. Part of this quote erroneously omitted from advance sheet, see Truck
Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, Nos. 20,077, 20,131, at 8 (D.C. Cir., May 18, 1967).
30 Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
31 Vaca v. Sipes, 87 S. Ct. 903, 915 (1967).
32 The Supreme Court had previously noted that there is a difference of opinion as to
whether a breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice, but it has left
the issue open. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344 (1964); Local 100, United
Association of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696 n.7 (1963).
33 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1964). See generally Khan, supra note
5; Mater & Mangum, supra note 5.
34 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953). See also
Blumrosen, supra note 13, at 1475-76.
35 Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568, 379 F.2d 137, 142 (1967). Most of the'cases the
Board has considered in this area concern unfair representation by a union because of racial
discrimination. E.g. Cargo Handlers, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (1966) (union violated §§
[Vol. 43: 227]
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tail could be considered an instance of unfair representation, the court in Truck
Drivers Local was compelled to look to the traditional criterion employed by
the courts under Steele. In an analogous situation,16 the Supreme Court had
maintained the balance between protection of individual rights on one hand
and union flexibility on the other by requiring the union to use "complete
good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." 7 This was
basically an application of the broad principle of Steele that a union must
"exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it
acts, without hostile discretion against them.""8 The same criterion of rationality
and good faith has been employed by the courts when evaluating the validity
of a negotiation of seniority rights. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in O'Don-
nell v. Pabst Brewing Company 9 upheld a union's dovetailing of seniority
rosters on the ground that the bargaining which produced the dovetail arrange-
ment was made in good faith and reached a fair and equitable solution to the
merger problem.40 In Humphrey v. Moore,"' the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a dovetailing of seniority rosters performed by a union after
the merger of two companies was valid because the union arrived at its posi-
tion honestly, in good faith, and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination.43
However, in Ferro v. Railway Express Agency,43 the Second Circuit held that
a union settlement that sacrificed a minority of the members' seniority rights
was invalid because it was based on internal political considerations rather than
on any rational standard. The court reasoned:
A bargain which favors one class of employees over another is not
necessarily prohibited as a hostile discrimination. . . . However, it is not
proper for a bargaining agent in representing all of the employees to draw
distinctions among them which are based upon their political power within
the union.
44
Thus, the Second Circuit has removed the political element as a possible jus-
tification for an otherwise unfair or irrational arrangement of seniority rights.45
The obvious principle to be drawn from these cases is that a union will
be allowed the wide range of discretion necessary for a bargaining representa-
8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2) by operating a hiring system in a manner whereby Negroes were
discriminated against in job opportunities because of race); Local 1367, Int'l Longshoreman's
Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964) [work quotas maintained on a racial basis are a violation of §
8(b) (1) (A)]; Independent Metal Workers Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573
(1964) [refusal by a union to handle a Negro's grievance complaint because of his race is
a violation of §§ 8(b) (1) (A), 8(b) (2), and 8(b)(3)].
36 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). In this case a union entered an
agreement extending seniority to include time spent in military service even before employment
with Ford Motor Company. The court sustained this provision by holding that it was in
accord with public policy and inherently fair. Id. at 339. (1953).
37 Id. at 338.
38 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
39 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961).
40 Id. at -, 107 N.W. 2d at 490.
41 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
42 Id. at 350.
43 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961).
44 Id. at 851.
45 Blumrosen, supra note 13, at 1480.
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tive, as long as its seniority policy is rational and arranged in good faith.4 6
However, if as in Ferro, the union arbitrarily and unjustifiably abridges a
minority group's seniority rights, it will be held guilty of a violation, of its
statutory duty of fair representation.
Relying on Ferro, the court in Truck Drivers Local found that the facts
presented clearly established that UTE's conduct was such as to fall within the
defined judicial class of unfair representation. The UTE statement was adamant
and absolute; it would never agree to dovetail the seniority roster. The only
reasonable conclusion was that the statement was made purely to gain the
votes of the numerically superior UTE members at the expense of the rights
of the minority Teamsters."
Hence, the criterion for determining what is an instance of unfair repre-
senation in regard to seniority rights is still the judicial standard formulated
in Steele and applied in such cases as Ferro. However, by holding that this
unfair representation is also a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A), the court in
Truck Drivers Local has given an individual whose seniority rights have been
unfairly abridged the possibility of obtaining relief in two forums - the courts
and the NLRB.
However, the court in Truck Drivers Local could not base its ultimate
decision on the ground that an adamant refusal to dovetail by an exclusive
bargaining agent is an unfair labor practice. Both elections had been set aside.
UTE, therefore, was not as yet the exclusive bargaining agent for both groups
of employees, and thus, the duty of fair representation had not yet attached to
UTE. In' the words of Judge McGowan, "the question is whether threatened
action which would violate a union's fair representation duty constitutes an
unfair labor practice."4 The court answered this question in the affirmative,
relying on the fact that UTE's threatened refusal to dovetail seniority rights
had the effect of presently restraining both the UTE members and the Team-
sters from exercising their rights to freely choose a bargaining representative
guaranteed under section 7.49 To UTE members, the "no-dovetailing" state-
ment was in effect the promise of a benefit; namely, their seniority rights would
be illegally preserved if they voted for UTE. As such, the promise restrained
them from voting for the possibly more advantageous terms of the Teamsters
46 Various commentators would impose what would seem to be an even stricter duty
than that required by case law on unions seeking to justify such an abridgment of seniority
rights. Alfred W. Blumrosen has stated that
the duty of fair representation should allow the union, in good faith, to negotiate
changes in conditions of employment as to all matters except seniority rights. To
justify an abridgment of seniority rights, the union must show not only that it
exercised an honest judgment, but also that it made an appropriate decision, one
based on objective factors, which would persuade a rational decision-maker, and
not compelled by the internal political make-up of the union. Blumrosen, supra note
13, at 1482.
Harry H. Wellington writes that even though "position on the seniority ladder is subject to
revision, bargaining for its total elimination seems clearly outside the expectation of the
employee community." Wellington, supra note 13, at 1361.
47 Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 143 (1967).
48 Id. at 144.
49 Id. at 144-45.
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contract."0 To the Teamsters, the "no-dovetailing" stand of UTE was a direct.
threat to their seniority which, in effect, forced them to vote for the Teamster
contract without considering the UTE contract on its merits. Thus, the free-
dom of choice of both groups, guaranteed by section 7 and protected from union
interference by section 8(b) (1) (A), was restrained by the UTE threat.
5 '
In the final analysis, UTE was found guilty of an 8(b) (1) (A) violation
not because it violated its duty of fair representation, but because it infringed
upon the employees' freedom of choice.52 It would seem that the right to free-
dom of choice would still be infringed by the threat, whether or not the actual
effectuation of the threat is considered an unfair labor practice. If such is the
case, then the court in Truck Drivers Local has gone to great lengths in its first
two steps to prove that unfair representation in the nature of an arbitrary re-
fusal to dovetail seniority rosters is an unfair labor practice, but this proof was
not necessary for the actual decision in the case. Instead, the result hinged on
the more traditional theory of freedom of choice guaranteed employees by sec-
tion 7, and in effect applied the fundamental principles of this concept to the
facts.
The query, then, is why the court bothered to extensively treat the com-
plex issue of unfair representation, when its determination was not of vital
necessity in resolving the precise question before it. One explanation could be
that the holding of the first two steps tended to round out the symmetry of the
entire opinion. If unfair representation were not held to be an unfair labor
practice, an anomalous situation would result. Specifically, the threat of unfair
representation would be an unfair labor practice since it would result in impair-
ment of the freedom of choice guaranteed by section 7 and protected by
8(b) (1) (A); the actual fact of unfair representation, however, would not be
an unfair labor practice, but would only be "illegal" under the statutory duty
announced in Steele. Also, and perhaps of even greater significance, the case
gave the court a forum to present its views on the vital question of unfair
50 The Teamsters contract called for overtime pay after 8 hours a day, the UTE after
10. Unlike the UTE contract, the Teamsters contract provided for overtime pay for work
on the sixth day and double time for work on the seventh. It also had superior vacation
plans, an employer-supported pension plan, health and welfare plans, and employee cost-of-
living allowances. Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 145 n.16
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
51 An incumbent union's threat that it will cause any employee who supports a petitioning
union to lose his job has been held to violate § 8(b) (1) (A) because it deprives the employees
of their freedom of choice guaranteed by § 7. A. 0. Smith Corp. v. NLRB, 343 F.2d 103,
108, 115 (7th Cir. 1965); Local 511, St. Louis Offset Printing Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 324,
326, 327 (1961). A promise of benefit by a union has also been considered disruptive of free
choice. NLRB v. Gilmore Indus., Inc., 341 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez
& Morell, S. en C., 328 F.2d 679, 680 (1st Cir. 1964). Furthermore, in framing §
8(b) (1) (A) Congress intended to impose upon unions the same restrictions that the Wagner
Act imposed upon employees with respect to violations of employee rights. International
Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961). An employer's promises
of benefit have been held to be as effective as threatened detriment in discouraging union
activity and have been found violative of § 8(a) (1). E.g. Joy Silk Mills v. NLRB, 185 F.2d
732, 739 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
52 The court recognized that not every promise of benefit or threat of reprisal made by
a union in the heat of a campaign will be held an unfair labor practice. In some cases,
merely setting aside the election will suffice. But here, it noted, two elections had already
been set aside and there was no assurance the situation had been remedied, so a cease and
desist order seemed the only effective solution. Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB,
379 F.2d 137, 144 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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representation and to align itself firmly with the growing trend to regard such
action as an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
By allowing the NLRB to brand as an unfair labor practice the threat
of an illegal arrangement of seniority rights, the decision in Truck Drivers Local
should serve to prevent the stalemates and repeated elections present in the
typical merger situation. Moreover, the court's ancillary determination that
the exclusive bargaining agent can be guilty of an unfair labor practice for a
violation of its duty of fair representation, gives the NLRB the power to demand
an equitable and good faith arrangement between unions in consolidating
seniority rights after a merger. This expansion of NLRB jurisdiction may require
the Board to investigate the substantive validity of collective bargaining agree-
ments to determine if seniority rights have been arbitrarily abused. This expan-
sion of Board control may mean an expansion of governmental control over
the substantive issues involved in private collective bargaining." However, it
appears that the possibility of government interference is an unavoidable by-
product if the minority union's seniority rights are to receive the efficacious-
protection that the NLRB is most suited to give."
John Rittinger
PROCEDURE - CORPORATIONS - A FOREIGN CORPORATION Is SUBJECT TO
JURISDICTION IN AN IN PERSONAzf ACTION IF ITS INDEPENDENT RESIDENT
AGENT Is DOING ALL THE BUSINESS IN THE FORUM STATE WHICH THE FOREIGN
CORPORATION COULD Do WERE IT THERE BY ITS OwN OFFICIALS. - Jack
Frummer was a resident of New York State. In 1963, while on a visit to England,
he was injured while taking a shower in his room at the London Hilton Hotel.
The London Hilton is leased and operated by Hilton Hotels (U.K.) Limited
[hereinafter U.K. Limited]. Frummer brought an action for personal injuries
in the New York Supreme Court of Kings County seeking $150,000 in dam-
ages from U.K. Limited; Hilton Hotels International, Incorporated, the parent
of U.K. Limited; and Hilton Hotels Corporation, an affiliate of Hilton Hotels
International. Though Hilton Hotels International is partly owned by Hilton
Hotels Corporation, the two have somewhat different stock ownership and the
shares of each are separately listed on public stock exchanges. In addition to
complete ownership of U.K. Limited, Hilton Hotels International is co-owner
with Hilton Hotels Corporation of the Hilton Reservation Service [Reserva-
tion Service]. The Reservation Service maintains offices in New York City in
order to confirm availabilities at any Hilton Hotel and any of fifty associated
hotels having no connection with the Hilton chain. Hilton International, Hilton
Hotels Corporation, U.K. Limited, and the Reservation Service are distinct cor-
porate entities. The management and books of each corporation are separate.
Hilton Hotels Corporation and Hilton Hotels International are Delaware cor-
porations licensed to do business in New York State.
53 For a detailed study of the advantages of Board action in the area of unfair repre-
sentation plus a consideration of the problems such jurisdiction would raise, See generally
Blumrosen, supra note 13, at 1504-17; Wellington, supra note 13, at 1357-62; Note, supra
note 15, at 711.
54 Wellington, supra note 13, at 1357-62; See also Blumrosen, supra note 13, at 1514-17.
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U.K. Limited moved for an order to dismiss the complaint against it on
the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over its person. The plaintiff
argued that service of process on U.K. Limited was valid because it had trans-
acted business in New York through the Reservation Service thereby fulfilling
the requirements of section 302(a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules,' New York's "long-arm" statute. U.K. Limited's motion for dismissal
was denied by the Supreme Court of Kings County and the denial was affirmed
by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals of New
York, in a four-to-three decision, affirmed and held: a foreign corporation is
subject to jurisdiction in an in personam action if its independent resident agent
is doing all the business which the foreign corporation could do were it in the
forum state by its own officials. Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, In-
corporated, 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967), petition
for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3076 (U.S. August 11, 1967) (No. 479).
"Concepts of due process in the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign de-
fendants have changed through the years with the growth of commerce and the
ever-increasing mobility of people and things."' In 1839, the Supreme Court
in Bank of Augusta v. Earle' stated that a corporation could be subjected to
suit only in the state of its incorporation since it had no legal existence outside
of such state. In Pennoyer v. Neff4 the Supreme Court qualified this strict rule
somewhat by holding that jurisdiction could be asserted over a person so long
as he was physically present within the forum jurisdiction. In order to acquire
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation under the Pennoyer rule, the courts
relied upon the consent and presence theories. Under the consent theory, a
foreign corporation was subject to suit because the state imposed, as a condition
to doing business there, a requirement that the foreign corporation "consent"
to be sued in that jurisdiction.5 Where consent was not found, a foreign cor-
poration could become amenable to process by conducting business to such an
extent that it was considered "present" in the jurisdiction.6
1 N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 302(a) (McKinney Supp. 1967) provides in part:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor
or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state ....
2 Shepherd, How Long Is the Long Arm of Due Process?, 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 297
(1967).
3 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) (dictum).
4 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
5 The consent theory assumed that a state could prevent a foreign corporation from
doing business within its borders. A necessary corollary was that the state could also impose
conditions on the doing of business, one of which was that the foreign corporation "consent"
to be sued in the forum jurisdiction by virtue of its doing business in the state. Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 '(1855). Accord, St. Clair v. Cox, 106
U.S. 350, 356 (1882); St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423, 429 (1870).
6 Under the presence theory, it was held:
A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability,
in the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such
manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there.
Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (emphasis added).
See St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226 (1913). Thus, the presence theory was
formulated as an alternative to the consent theory. However, the presence theory was
defective in the sense that the foreign corporation must have been "carrying on business
within the State at the time of the attempted service!' International Harvester Co. of
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The modem development of the law in this area began with International
Shoe Company v. Washington7 wherein the Supreme Court held that a state
could subject a nondoriciliary to in personam jurisdiction where the non-
domiciliary has "certain minimum contacts with it [the forum jurisdiction] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' "' International Shoe served as a departure from the
older consent and presence theories in that it departed from the mechanical
or quantitative standards of those theories. Henceforth, "[w]hether due process
is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure."9 In short, the minimum contacts
test of International Shoe sets the outer constitutional limits for the drafting
of state long-arm statutes. Some states have failed to take advantage of Inter-
national Shoe and have retained their older statutes." Other states, notably
Illinois," have enacted statutes intended to extend their jurisdiction to the
furthest reach allowable under International Shoe. The International Shoe test
does not, however, give the states a free rein in determining the extent of their
jurisdiction."2 The Supreme Court, in Hanson v. Denckla,5 clearly held that
it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. . .. Those restric-
tions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of
the respective States.1 ' (Citations omitted.)
Section 302, modeled after the Illinois Act, is obviously an attempt by the
New York legislature to completely occupy the area of jurisdiction created by
International Shoe.15 The transacting business test of section 302(a) requires
considerably less contact with the forum jurisdiction than the traditional doing
business test.' However, section 302, by its own terms, is not of universal
America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585 (1914) '(emphasis added). Under either theory,
interpretation of the phrase "doing business" was mechanical and quantitative.
7 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8 Id. at 316.
9 Id. at 319.
10 See, e.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. 27-340 (1947).
11 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
12 It appeared that the Supreme Court was moving in this direction when it decided
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In that case, jurisdiction was
upheld on the basis of one contract which the Court felt had a "substantial connection"
with the forum state. Id. at 223. However, the Court's decision may have been motivated,
at least in part, by the inconvenience and expense to the plaintiff in bringing suit on the
defendant's home ground. See id. at 223. McGee has been recognized as the "furthest
reach" of the Internatonal Shoe doctrine. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d
508, 510 (2d Cir. 1960).
13 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
14 Id. at 251. For a detailed analysis of the development of the law from International
Shoe to Hanson, see Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cir. L. REv. 569, 586-624 (1958). See gen-
erally O'Connor & Goff, Expanded Concepts of State jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: The
Illinois Revised Practice Act, 31 NoTRE DAME LAwvar 223, 225-33, 247-49 (1956).
15 "With the enactment of this statute [§ 302], New York has decided to exploit the
fullest jurisdictional potential permissible under federal constitutional restraints." McLaughlin,
Practice Commentary, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 302, at 428 (McKinney 1963).
16 "The term 'transaction of business' [in § 302(a)] includes all cases which meet the
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applicability since it is confined to causes of action arising out of the foreign
corporation's local activities. Because of this, both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Frummer were quick to point out that section 302(a) was in-
applicable since the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise from U.K. Limited's
transaction of any business in New York." However, the plaintiff was still able
to rely on section 301 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. Section
301 provides: "A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property,
or status as might have been exercised heretofore."'8 This section retains in the
New York courts the traditional power to "subject a foreign corporation to
personal jurisdiction because it 'does business' in New York .... ."" Thus, the
majority in Frummer felt that this section allowed the court to obtain jurisdic-
tion over a cause of action arising from the out-of-state activities of a foreign
corporation, if the corporation were actually doing business in New York.2"
Hence, the plaintiff in Frummer was faced with a two-fold problem. First,
he had to establish the minimum contacts of U.K. Limited through the activities
of the Reservation Service since U.K. Limited did not, as such, conduct any
activities in New York. This required a circumvention of the corporate separate-
ness doctrine.2' Secondly, the plaintiff had to prove that the acts of the Reserva-
tion Service were sufficient in themselves to constitute minimum contact in the
face of New York's established rule that "mere solicitation" is not enough to
constitute doing business in New York. 2
Admitting that "mere solicitation" is not enough to constitute doing busi-
ness under section 301,2" the majority of the court in Frummer noted that the
Reservation Service maintained an office in New York, did public relations
work, maintained its own bank account and telephone number, and accepted
and confirmed room reservations for the London Hilton.2 4 Relying on these
additional factors to find more than "mere solicitation," Chief Judge Fuld,
speaking for the majority, cited Bryant v. Finnish National Airline.2" In Bryant,
older 'doing business' test of jurisdiction as well as cases where the defendant's activities
amount to something less than 'doing business.'" O'Connor & Goff, supra note 14, at 236.
17 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 535-36, 539, 227 N.E.2d 851,
852-53, 855, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43, 46 (1967).
18 N.Y. Gsv. PRAC. § 301 (McKinney 1963).
19 McLaughlin, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 301, at 401 (McKinney 1963).
"[Ilt is clear that this [the doing business test] is the test that must be satisfied in order to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements of CPLR § 301." Lumbermen's Mut. Gas. Go.
v. Borden Go., 265 F. Supp. 99, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (mem.).
20 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 536, 227 N.E.2d, 851, 853,
281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (1967).
21 The respondent has taken the position at all times that Hilton Hotels (U.K.)
Limited is nothing more than a wholly owned subsidiary, a fixture and a creature
of the Hilton Hotels International Inc., which in turn is a virile offspring of Hilton
Hotels Corporation, the parent corporate entity. Brief for Respondent at 14, Frummer
v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41
(1967).
22 Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 475, 480, 151 N.E.2d 874, 876, 176 N.Y.S.2d
318, 321 (1958); Elish v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 305 N.Y. 267, 269, 112 N.E.2d 842, 843
(1953).
23 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 536, 227 N.E.2d 851, 853, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, 45 (1967).
24 Id. at 537, 227 N.E.2d at 853-54, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 44. The dissent was quick to
point out that the Reservation Service did not accept and confirm room reservations at the
London Hilton, but that it only confirmed availabilities based on forecasts supplied by the
hotels. Id. at 541-42, 227 N.E.2d at 856, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 48 (dissenting opinion).
25 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
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a 1965 New York Court of Appeals decision, the plaintiff was injured in Paris,
allegedly through the negligent operation of the defendant's aircraft. Though
the airline operated no aircraft within -the United States, it was held to be
doing business in New York since it maintained an office in New York City,
employed several people and had a bank account in New York, did public
relations and publicity work for the airline, and helped to generate its business.2"
However, it should be noted that in Bryant it was the defendant airline itself
that operated the local office.
Thus, having established that the activities of the Reservation Service were
sufficient to establish presence, the majority then faced its major hurdle, i.e.,
linking these activities to U.K. Limited. As pointed out by the dissent,
a foreign parent corporation will not be subjected to the judicial jurisdiction
of a State merely because of its ownership of a subsidiary corporation doing
business within the State, if the parent diligently maintains the formal
separateness of the subsidiary entity .... 27
By this statement, the dissent seems to imply that this rule should also be applied
where the intercorporate relationship is that of affiliate, rather than parent-
subsidiary. The majority circumvented the corporate separateness problem by
finding an agency relationship between U.K. ,Limited and the Reservation
Service. According to the majority:
[Tihis appeal deals with the jurisdiction of our courts over a foreign corpora-
tion rather than the liability of a parent company for the acts of a wholly
owned subsidiary ... The "presence" of Hilton (U.K.) in New York, for
purposes of jurisdiction, is established by the activities conducted here on
its behalf by its agent, the Hilton Reservation Service, and the fact that the
two are commonly owned is significant only because it gives rise to a valid
inference as to the broad scope of the agency in the absence of an express
agency agreement .... 25 (Emphasis added.)
By basing its decision on this agency relationship, the majority was forced to
distinguish Miller v. Surf Properties, Incorporated.29 In Miller, the Court of
Appeals had ruled against an attempt to serve an out-of-state motel on the
basis of the activities carried on in its behalf by a local independent travel agent.
The local agent in Miller confirmed availabilities at the defendant's hotel and
26 Id. at 432, 208 N.E.2d at 441-42, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 628-29.
27 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 544, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, 50 (1967) (dissenting opinion). The dissent cited, among others, Cannon
Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) which is regarded as the leading
case in this area. Cannon is generally cited for the proposition that business activities carried
on by a subsidiary in the forum state cannot be the basis for asserting juridiction over a
foreign parent. The decision was not based on constitutional grounds, however, and the
Court left open the question of whether Congress could authorize such a basis for jurisdiction.
Id. at 336. See also Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th
Cir. 1964) (mere ownership of all stock in a subsidiary is not sufficient in itself to justify
holding the parent corporation amenable to jurisdiction); Echeverry v. Kellogg Switchboard
& Supply Co., 175 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1949).
28 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels, Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 538, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, 45 (1967).
29 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958).
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occasionally solicited customers for the hotel."0 The Miller court refused to
assert jurisdiction because it felt that these activities amounted to no more than
mere solicitation. The Frummer majority pointed out that in Miller the New
York agent was completely independent of the Florida hotel and that it rep-
resented thirty other unassociated Florida establishments. The court quoted
from Bryant their previous discussion of the Miller case.
[W]e found it significant that in the Miller case the New York activities
were carried on "not [by] an employee of the defendant [Florida hotel] but
an independent travel agency representing defendant in New York City."31
Turning to the possible ramifications of their decision, the majority noted
that it was "not unmindful that litigation in a foreign jurisdiction is a burden-
some inconvenience for any company,"32 but pointed out that this is the price
which a corporation must pay in return for the benefits of conducting business
abroad."
Judge Breitel, author of the dissenting. opinion in Frummer, began by
manifesting a much greater concern for the business community. He noted
that
important policy and commercial considerations are involved in preventing
or allowing business enterprise to limit liability, suability, and exposure to
governmental regulation, by the creation of truly separate corporate entities,
with or without separate ownership structures, but especially where the
ownership is not identical. 4
The dissent viewed Bryant as one of a variety of unusual situations which
the doing business test had been "stretched to cover."35 But even accepting the
Bryant decision, the dissenters could not agree with the majority's distinguishing
of the Miller case. To Judge Breitel, the activities engaged in by the travel
agent in Miller and the Reservation Service in Frummer were identical. He was
not swayed by the majority's argument that Miller involved a completely inde-
pendent agent.
That in the Miller case a wholly separate enterprise was involved is not the
distinction, unless, of course, the separateness of parent and subsidiary
corporations is to be wholly ignored, a position which the majority pur-
portedly disavows, but yet takes by "inference." 36
30 Id. at 478-80, 151 N.E.2d at 875-76, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 319-21.
31 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 538, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854,
281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 45 (1967). Actually, the quoted statement is ambiguous. The court in
Bryant may have been implying that jurisdiction was denied in Miller, not because of the
independence of the local agent, but because process was served on the independent agent.
Thus, the implication is that it was an improper service of process. See Bryant v. Finnish
Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 431, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628 (1965).
No such situation obtains in Frummer since process was served directly on U.K. Limited.
However, the statement still has a certain significance in that it indicates what the Frummer
majority felt to be a distinguishing factor, i.e., the presence of an independent agent in
Miller.
32 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 538, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, 45 (1967).
33 Id. at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
34 Id. at 540, 227 N.E.2d at 855, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 46-47 (dissenting opinion).
35 Id. at 539, 227 N.E.2d at 855, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (dissenting opinion).
36 Id. at 542, 227 N.E.2d at 856-57, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 48 (dissenting opinion).
[December, 1967]
CASE COMMENTS
Hence, the dissenters felt that the majority decision was logical only if "the
intercorporate relations are made a determining factor in this very case and
generalized disavowals [of the majority] fail to obscure the reasoning process
involved.""7
Viewing the majority opinion in this light, the dissent then analyzed cases
where corporate separateness had been disregarded and concluded that such
action is justified only where interrelated corporations do not, among themselves,
honor the separate nature of their entities.3 Other cases were distinguished
on the ground that in those cases the foreign corporations themselves were
directly engaged in doing business in the state. 9
The dissent then stated what it felt to be the adverse effects of the majority's
disregard of the formal separateness of U.K. Limited and the Reservation Service.
Primarily, the dissent envisioned that extensions of the long-arm doctrine could
"easily lend themselves to reciprocal manipulation against American enterprises
operating through subsidiaries or affiliates in other countries."4 Secondly, the
dissent noted that the rule applied in Frummer would not remain limited and that
"nonresidents would also be able to sue in New York where tort verdicts are
regarded as very high ...."
An analysis of the Frummer case in light of Bryant and Miller suggests that
the dissent may well have revealed the true basis of the majority's holding.
In Bryant, where jurisdiction was upheld, the local activities were performed
by the defendant corporation itself. Hence, it was proper for the Bryant court,
in applying the doing business test, to consider such local activities as the main-
tenance of an office in New York, the maintenance of a bank account, and the
employment of several persons in the New York office.2 These local activities
were all carried out by the defendant in Bryant for its own benefit. But in Miller,
where an independent agent was involved, the court considered only those
activities conducted by the agent exclusively for the benefit of that particular
defendant. It did not consider that the local independent agent maintained
an office in New York, kept its own bank account, and employed several clerks
in the operation of his business.43 These activities were carried out by the agent
for its own benefit. If the majority in Frummer respected the corporate separate-
ness of U.K. Limited and the Reservation Service, it should have treated the
37 Id. at 543, 227 N.E.2d at 857-58, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (dissenting opinion).
38 See, e.g., Public Adm'r v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877,
278 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1967) (subsidiary of Canadian bank was, in fact, if not in name, the
Canadian bank); Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97,
204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965) (wholly owned sub-subsidiary, which sold and
serviced British corporation's products in state, was a mere department of British corporation,
rather than independent entity); Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 302 N.Y. 892, 100
N.E.2d 177 (1951) (mem.) (separate entity of sales corporation nominal only).
39 See, e.g., Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965) (defendant airline maintained a local office). See also Elish v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry., 305 N.Y. 267, 112 N.E.2d 842 (1953) (defendant maintained offices in New
York, held board meetings there, and carried on other activities).
40 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 546, 227 N.E.2d 851, 859, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, 52 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
41 Id. at 546, 227 N.E.2d at 859, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 52 (dissenting opinion).
42 Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 429-30, 208 N.E.2d 439, 440, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625, 626-27 (1965).




Reservation Service as an independent agent of U.K. Limited. By so doing, the
court would have been unable to consider, as it did, that "the Hilton Reserva-
tion Service . . . has a New York office, as well as a New York bank account
and telephone number."44 The only activity of the Reservation Service which
was exclusively attributable to U.K. Limited was the confirming of avail-
abilities at the London Hilton, and certainly under the holding in Miller such
activities would not amount to more than "mere solicitation."
Furthermore, the majority may have implied that it was utilizing the cor-
porate relationship in U.K. Limited and the Reservation Service when it stated
that "the fact that the two [U.K. Limited and the Reservation Service] are
commonly owned is significant only because it gives rise to a valid inference
as to the broad scope of the agency . . . ."" At best, this statement serves as a
vague denial that the corporate separateness doctrine has been rebuked. It could,
however, also be taken to mean that the intercorporate relation raises an
inference sufficient to give the agency argument strength enough to place
Frummer directly within the range of Bryant. It appears reasonable to assume,
considering the similarity of the activities found insufficient in Miller and the
activities that the Reservation Service performed exclusively for the benefit of
U.K. Limited, that had this "inference" not been raised, the agency betweenI
the two would have been insufficient to comply with the doing business test
under section 301. At the very least, the majority would have had a harder case.
Thus, while purportedly upholding the corporate separateness doctrine, the inter-
corporate relation of the defendant and the Reservation Service was probably
the deciding factor in the majority's assertion of jurisdiction.
This is not to say, however, that the majority was unwarranted in ignoring
the separateness of the two corporations. Many commentators have advocated
ignoring the doctrine altogether on the question of jurisdiction. As stated by one
authority:
If defendant maintains an agency within the state for regular solicita-
tion, sales, purchasing, or servicing of its product, this fact should suffice
even though the agency is an independent corporate entity .... [A]n older
line of cases which denied jurisdiction over a parent corporation which
did business within the state through a subsidiary seems to die hard.4 6
The holding in Frummer, interpreted as being based upon the intercorporate
relationship of U.K. Limited and the Reservation Service, is a logical step
forward within the limits of the minimum contacts test of International Shoe.
The only fault in the majority opinion is its vagueness when facing the true
issue, i.e., whether the corporate relationship of the parties should be a factor
in finding jurisdiction.
As noted above, the dissent indicated what it felt to be the deleterious
results of this decision. It feared that "foreign jurisdictions" would reciprocate
with like decisions or laws against American corporations. Such reasoning
44 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 227 N.E.2d 851, 853, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, 44 (1967).
45 Id. at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
46 F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 646 (1965).
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ignores the fact that such an extension of personal jurisdiction may be war-
ranted. If so, it is certainly reasonable for American corporations to expect the
same treatment from foreign tribunals when they derive a benefit from their
activities abroad. As stated by the majority, the inconvenience of litigating in
a foreign jurisdiction "is part of the price which may properly be demanded
of those who extensively engage in international trade."47  The most serious
objection of the dissent, i.e., the rule could be extended to allow nonresident
plaintiffs to sue foreign corporations in New York courts, fails to take account
of the due process requirements of the International Shoe test. Imposing a large
evidentiary and financial burden upon a foreign corporation 8 with no cor-
responding benefit to the forum state's residents would seem to go beyond
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""9 And even assuming
that due process requirements would not be violated in such a situation, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens would always be available.50
Offsetting these possible harmful effects is the sensible result of having
foreign corporations answerable for claims that properly lie against them.
Frummer does not attack the right of a corporation to limit its liability by cre-
ating affiliate or subsidiary corporations. It does, however, attack a foreign
parent's use of a local affiliate to defeat jurisdiction. As one writer has noted,
the basic rationale of the corporate separateness doctrine is not violated by such
a result.
To the extent that the corporations are kept financially separate and in-
dependent, there is good reason to protect management's use of de-
centralization of its operations to obviate the risk that a liability incurred
by one division of its business may be the end of the entire concern. It
is an entirely different matter . . . to shield the parent corporation from
having to defend claims against the parent because the claimant may be
unable to bring suit anywhere but in his home state .... '-
The Frummer majority did not hold that the Reservation Service was liable
for U.K. Limited's actions. Its assets are still protected against any liability to
Frummer and, in that sense, the corporate separateness doctrine still applies.
The intercorporate relation between U.K. Limited and the Reservation Service
was utilized only to determine whether U.K. Limited was subject to New York
jurisdiction.
Frummer is a far cry from Bank of Augusta. Indeed, even Pennoyer has
47 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 538, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, 45 (1967).
48 See generally Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations-An Analysis of Due
Process, 104 U. PA. L. Rzv. 381, 397-99 (1955).
49 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
50 New York courts recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens. However, in New
York the doctrine is restricted in the sense that it can only be applied where all parties are
nonresidents and the cause of action arose outside of New York. Compare Creegan v.
Sczykno, 24 App. Div. 2d 756, 263 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1965) (mnem.) with Wagner v. Braunsberg,
5 App. Div. 2d 564, 173 N.Y.S.2d 525, appeal denied, 6 App Div. 2d 790, 175 N.Y.S.2d
568 (1958). Nevertheless, forum non conveniens would be applicable even under the restricted
New York version in the situation envisioned by the dissent since the parties would be non-
residents and the cause of action would arise outside of New York.
51 Note, supra note 48, at 405.
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long been regarded as a relic of the past. One authority has written:
The long arm of due process is indeed far longer than we once might
have imagined, and the direction of growth fails to show any indication
of regression. On the contrary, the pendulum perhaps must swing some
more toward a further relaxation in defining the presence of a foreign
defendant in the state.
52
The trend is obvious. The holding in Frummer is merely a continuation of that
trend.
Laurent L. Rousseau
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL RIGHTS - STATE ENJOINED FROM CON-
TRACTING WTH CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES WHO OBTAIN THEIR LABOR FORCE
FROM RACIALLY EXCLUSIVE CRAFT UNIONS. - In March, 1967, the defen-
dants, as duly elected and appointed officials' of the State of Ohio, were about
to enter into contracts for the construction of the Medical Basic Sciences Build-
ing [hereinafter the Project] on the campus of Ohio State University. The
Project was to be financed by state and federal funds. Contracts had been
sent to at least four contractors who had submitted bids on the Project, and
these contracts had been duly signed and returned. Although the defendants
had not yet signed the contracts on the state's behalf, they had made a declara-
tion of intention to sign them.
The plaintiffs, both Negroes, were technically schooled, qualified, and
experienced - one as an electrician and the other as a heavy equipment opera-
tor. They learned, after making several unsuccessful attempts to obtain direct
employment with the construction companies seeking the government contracts,
that it was the unwavering practice of these contractors to do all of their hiring
through certain craft unions. The plaintiffs had simultaneously been attempting
to gain admission to these unions, but had been unsuccessful. The union
officials whom they were required to see in order to gain membership were
"out" each time the plaintiffs had tried to contact them. Thus, having been
effectively prevented from obtaining employment on the Project, the plaintiffs
brought a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio to enjoin the state from entering into such contracts on the
ground that such action would be a deprivation, under color of state law, of
their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States. Specifically,
they charged that the state's intended entry into the proposed contracts was a
knowing participation2 in a pattern of racially discriminatory conduct prohibited
52 Shepherd, How Long Is the Long Arm of Due Process?, 34 INs. COUNSEL J. 297,
303 (1967).
1 Defendants were James A. Rhodes, Governor of the State of Ohio, Alfred Gienow,
Director of the Ohio Department of Public Works, and John D. Herbert, Treasurer of the
State of Ohio.
2 At least one of the contractors who had signed and returned his contract to work
on the Project had refused to submit a "responsive bid" assuring his compliance with the
anti-discrimination provisions of the defendant Governor's executive order dealing with con-
struction contracts. Upon discovering that no responsive bids had been submitted in that
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by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and by sections
1981' and 19834 of title 42 of the United States 'Code.5 In a well-reasoned
opinion by Judge Kinneary, the district court held: where a state becomes a
joint participant with private persons for the purpose of constructing a public
education facility, it has an affirmative statutory obligation to insure compliance
by its private partner with the aims of the fourteenth amendment, and any
proposed contract between the state and a contractor who hires exclusively
through discriminating unions may be enjoined under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Eth-
ridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
Section 1983 was originally enacted in 1871 to protect the rights guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment. It was intended to give a remedy in law
and in equity to parties deprived of these constitutional rights by any person
acting under color of state law.6 Bound by its nature to the fourteenth amend-
ment, section 1983 has experienced a parallel development in both construction
and interpretation.
The purpose of the fourteenth amendment was set out in the Civil Rights
Cases' as being the prohibition of state action which was of a discriminatory
nature. The language of the opinion made it clear that the amendment's pro-
scription of racial discrimination did not extend to the invasion of an individual's
rights by nongovernmental persons.' This distinction between state action and
private action has proved difficult to apply. Generally, it can be said that the
concept of state action has been steadily expanded9 since the Civil Rights Cases.
contractor's category, defendant Gienow requested and received from defendant Rhodes a
waiver of the assurances requirement as applied to his contract. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F.
Supp. 83, 85-86 '(S.D. Ohio 1967).
3 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964) provides in part:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and none other ....
4 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides in part:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person
within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States shall ...
be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
5 Jurisdiction was also asserted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 2201 (1964).
6 It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation [§ 1983] was passed was to
afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion,
neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims
of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies. Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
7 109 U.S. 3 '(1883).
8 Id. at 11. The court in Ethridge noted that union officials' discriminatory conduct
would not violate the fourteenth amendment under the doctrine set out in the Civil Rights
Cases. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
9 Some commentators believe that, for all practical purposes, state action no longer
exists as a requirement of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Williams, The Twilight of
State Action, 41 TExAs L. Rxv. 347, 367 (1963); 65 Mixc. L. Rav. 777, 784 (1967).
See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), which indicates a tendency toward
erosion of the requirement at the Supreme Court level. Although the majority opinion
formally reaffirms the necessity of finding state action, it is significant to note that six of the
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Indeed, since that decision, state action has been held to encompass those situa-
tions in which state authority is brought to bear in sanctioning or facilitating
discrimination, even though the actual discrimination occurs at the level of
private action."0
Perhaps the most significant single extension of the state action concept
- and one relied on heavily by the court in Ethridge - was the Supreme Court's
decision in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority." In the language of
the Burton Court, a state's responsibility is to be interpreted "as necessarily
following upon 'state participation through any arrangement, management,
funds or property.' "" In Burton, a restaurant located within a large public
garage refused to serve the appellant solely because he was a Negro. The restau-
rant owner was the lessee of the Wilmington Parking Authority, a state agency
that owned and operated the garage. The appellant claimed that rights guar-,
anteed to him by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
had been abridged by the restaurant's refusal to serve him, and sought a declara-
tory judgment that the restaurant not be allowed to operate within a public
building in a racially discriminatory manner. The Delaware Supreme Court
held that the restaurant owner had acted in a "purely private capacity" and
that the appellant was therefore not entitled to relief.' 3 The United States
Supreme Court, while asserting that the application of "a precise formula for
recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an
'impossible task,' ""i reversed the decision of the state court and held:
[N]o State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring
them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may
be .... By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not
only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place
its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The
State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
Eagle [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in
the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to
have been so "purely private" as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'5 (Emphasis added.)
Justices, through two concurring opinions, agree that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment
empowers Congress to pass laws against all conspiracies which interfere with fourteenth
amendment rights, regardless of whether state action is present. Id. at 782 & n.6 (Brennan,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
10 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
11 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
12 Id. at 722.
13 Wilmington Parking Authority v. Burton, 39 Del. Ch. 10, 157 A.2d 894 '(1960),
rev'd, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
14 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
15 Id. at 725. The Court in Burton was clearly influenced by the fact that the land
and building were publicly owned, that the building was dedicated to public uses, and that
its acquisition, upkeep and maintenance were paid for by public funds. Accord, Simlns
v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
938 (1964). The defendant in the latter case, a private hospital which had received funds
through the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act, was held to have violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by its exclusion of Negro physicians,
dentists and patients from its facilities. The court found it
significant . . . that the defendant hospitals operate as integral parts of compre-
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The evidence presented to the district court in Ethridge established that:
(1) the defendants knew of the discriminatory pattern practiced by the unions
and contractors against Negroes solely on the basis of their race; (2) they knew
such a pattern had prevented Negroes from obtaining employment on previous
public construction projects; and (3) they knew that the uncorrected continua-
tion of the discriminatory policies of admission and referral by certain craft
unions, coupled with the contractors' refusal to hire from sources other than
the unions, would "inevitably and automatically" prevent Negroes in certain
crafts from obtaining employment on the Project. 6 These facts established,
Judge Kinneary applied the principles set out in Burton and found that the
state had abridged the plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment rights by becoming
ca joint participant in a pattern of racially discriminatory conduct by placing
itself in a position of interdependence with private 'individuals acting in such
a manner -that is, the proposed contractors acting under contract with unions
that bar Negroes .... "'" The court then reasoned that the "shocking lack of
concern" that the defendants displayed over the situation and their "failure
to assure qualified minority workers equal access to job opportunities on public
construction projects by acquiescing in the discriminatory practices of contrac-
tors and craft unions"'" represented an abuse of their positions and, therefore,
gave the plaintiffs a cause of action under section 1983."9
The court next considered the question of whether the plaintiffs' request
for injunctive relief ought to be granted. It is Judge Kinneary's affirmative
answer to this question that gives the Ethridge decision more than ordinary
significance. The language of section 1983 clearly allows equitable relief to
be granted, but does not require it. Courts have always been mindful of the
extraordinary nature of such relief2" and have awarded it only when it was
determined, under established standards, to be the proper method of redress.21
The standards have long been settled- the threatened injury must be irre-
parable, and there must exist no adequate remedy at law.22 Hence, the Ethridge
court noted that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that "plain, complete,
practical and efficient means of effecting justice may be obtained only through
the prompt administration of an injunction in equity."2
The defendants naturally asserted that adequate remedies at law were
provided for the injury set out in the complaint. Specifically, they cited title 42
of the United States Code, sections 2000e-1 to 15, and the Ohio Revised Code,
hensive joint or intermeshing state and federal plans or lrograms designed to
effect a proper allocation of available medical and hospital resources for the best
possible promotion and maintenance of public health. Such involvement in dis-
criminatory action "it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn."
(Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 967-68.
16 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 88.
19 Id.
20 3 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFi, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1431, at 484-85,
& nn.5.4-6 (Wright ed. 1958, Supp. 1966).
21 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903) [the Court refused to grant equitable relief
under REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)].
22 3 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 20, at 484 & n.5.5.
23 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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chapter 41124 They alleged that through the commissions set up by these
statutes and through judicial enforcement of their orders, the plaintiffs could
gain access to the labor organizations involved and receive a back pay award
for pecuniary damages suffered by reason of their exclusion from work on the
Project.2 The court was not persuaded by these assertions. Judge Kinneary
looked beyond the superficial appeal of this argument and emphasized the real
and recurrent nature of the injury.
[Wjhile the statutory provisions may serve to redress the pecuniary damage
resulting from discrimination, they do not take a single step toward
mending the psychological damage to both the party discriminated against
and others in the class he represents. It is evident from the testimony of
the several sociologists who appeared as witnesses in this case that discrimi-
nation in the area of employment stunts the educational and technical
potential development of the class subject to such inequities
2 s
Citing the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education," the court pointed
out that the psychological impact of discrimination is even greater where it is
bestowed with governmental sanction 2 8 Speaking of discrimination in public
education, the Supreme Court in Brown made the following pertinent comment:
To separate them [Negroes] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone. 9
Accordingly, the court in Ethridge held that the intangible nature of the injury
prevented its accurate monetary valuation thereby precluding the adequacy
of pecuniary relief afforded by any statute."
Apart from the inadequacy of any money award, the court found other
reasons why the plaintiffs could not obtain meaningful relief through the exist-
ing state and federal civil rights commissions. A history of ineffectiveness sur-
rounded the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. In this regard, the Director of the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission testified that the Commission had been "ineffec-
24 Although not argued by the defendants, it should be noted that money damages alone
could have been awarded under § 1983.
25 OrHIo REy. CoDE ANN. § 4112.05'(G) (Page Supp. 1966) provides in part:
If . . . the commission determines that the respondent has engaged in, or is
engaging in, any unlawful discriminatory practice, . . . the commission . . . shall
issue and . . . cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring such
respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful discriminatory practice and to
take such further affirmative or other action as will effectuate the purpose of
[this chapter], including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading of
employees with, or without, back pay, admission or restoration to union member-
ship ....
The defendants' allegation that the plaintiffs could receive a back pay award through the
commission established under the federal statute was ill-founded. The award of money
damages as a federal remedy is available only through federal courts after the commission
has failed to achieve voluntary compliance through conciliation. See text accompanying
notes 38-49 infra.
26 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
27 349 U.S. 294 (1955); 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28 Ethridge v: Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 89 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
29 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
30 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 89 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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tual in remedying discrimination in the craft unions."31 This ineffectiveness
had previously been noted by at least one commentator3 2 who ascribed the gen-
eral obsolescence and ineptitude of state fair employment practice commissions
to a general timidity of operation and a reluctance to broadly and rapidly
enforce anti-discrimination statutes. This same commentator concluded that
states that have such commissions have not managed to improve the problem
of discriminatory employment," and cited the State of Ohio as a typical ex-
ample3 4 The Director of the Ohio Commission also testified that "the case by
case approach which must be followed by that body results in too long a delay
before any meaningful steps will be made toward eliminating discrimination."3 3
Turning to the federal statute, the court noted that normal administrative
delay was compounded by the fact that the federal remedy could be used only
after the state administrative remedy had been sought.3, Therefore, it appeared
that no form of speedy, effective relief was available to the plaintiffs under
either the federal or state administrative remedy. Hence, with no adequate
remedy at law available, Judge Kinneary issued his sweeping injunctive order 7
which seemingly leaves no room for future racial discrimination in connection
with employment on the Project.
31 Id.
32 Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical
Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BuFrAx o L. Rsv. 22 (1964).
33 Id. passim.
34 Id. at 25.
35 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 89 (S.D. Ohio 1967). For similar criticism, see
Hill, supra note 32, at 33-34 where the author noted:
[T]he length of time it takes to settle a case is a discouraging factor to potential
complainants. To the end of 1947, the average time required to dispose of a case
was three months. .... "This is obviously too long a period to be effective for a
worker who has experienced discrimination, since it is not likely that he can afford
to remain unemployed for more than a few weeks while his complaint is being
handled. If many weeks go by and the Commission has not yet come to a decision,
the worker . . . probably has to get another job. When he does, the chances are
he is no longer interested in the one where he experienced the discrimination."
36 78 Stat. 259-60 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964) provides in pertinent part:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State,
or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the
unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or
local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice . . . upon receiving notice
thereof, no charge may be filed under [this section] by the person aggrieved before
the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the
State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated ....
37 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 89-90 (S.D. Ohio 1967). The order restrains
and enjoins the defendants, "their successors in office, agents, representatives, and employees"
from:
(1) Entering into the contracts already submitted by defendants to, and on their parts
executed by, the construction firms . . . for the construction of [the Project] under
the proposal and agreements which bind such contracting firms in their intended
performance of the said contracts;
(2) Entering into contracts for the construction of said [Project] with any persons who
are bound by any agreement, or otherwise, to secure their labor force exclusively
or primarily from any organization or source that does not supply or refer laborers
and craftsmen without regard to race, color, or membership in a labor union;
'(3) Entering into contracts for the construction of the said [Project] with any persons
who are bound by any agreement, or otherwise, with a labor organization, which
requires, as a condition of employment, that employees hired by such persons
become members of labor organization [sic] within a certain number of days after
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Because of the far-reaching impact of the decision in Ethridge and the
court's dismissal of the remedies afforded by title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 19641" [hereinafter title VII], a closer analysis of the objectionable features
of that statute seems necessary. As previously mentioned, had the court directed
the plaintiffs to seek relief under title VII, "no charge [could have been] fied
... by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings
[had] been commenced under the State ... law." 9 After receiving notice that
the state had terminated its proceedings under the state law, the plaintiffs would
then have had thirty days to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission 0 [hereinafter EEOC]. With receipt of
this charge, the federal procedure would finally have been triggered. The EEOC
at this point would have undertaken an investigation to determine whether there
was reasonable cause for believing that the charge was true. Finding the charge
valid, the EEOC would have sought to eliminate the discrimination through
conciliation. 4' If these conciliatory attempts had failed to achieve "voluntary
compliance" by the discriminating party within sixty days from receipt of the
charge, the EEOC would have notified the person aggrieved. Only then could
the plaintiffs have brought a civil action in a federal court.42 It has been held
that this attempt at conciliation "was intended by Congress to be and is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of a civil action under Title
VII .... ,,43
If the EEOC had determined, however, that the charge was without merit,
it is not clear whether the plaintiffs would thereby have been deprived of their
right to institute a civil action under title VII. Although the ambiguities ap-
parent in the statutory language make this a difficult question," one commen-
tator has stated: "[T]he Commission . . . [has] taken the position that no
requirement exists of a determination by the Commission of reasonable cause in
order for a suit to be brought. 45 Also revealing is this comment from the floor
debates preceding the enactment of the statute.
The Commission may find the claim invalid; yet the complainant still can
sue ... if he finds reasonable cause for doing so. In short, the Commission
does not hold the key to the courtroom door....
employment, and membership in such labor organizations is not equally available
to all persons without regard to race or color.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that:
(1) With respect to the construction of the [Project], [the defendants], their successors
in office, agents, representatives, and employees may enter into contracts only
with persons who will obligate themselves and be legally eligible and prepared
actually to secure a labor force only from sources that will reasonably insure equal
job opportunities to all qualified persons . ..without regard to race, color, or
membership or non-membership in a labor union. Id.
38 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to -15 (1964).
39 78 Stat. 259-60 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964).
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964).
41 Id. § 2000e-5(a) (1964). For a full discussion of the procedure under title
VII, see Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Procedure Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 55 ILL. B.J. 654 (1967).
42 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), (f) (1964).
43 Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964) provides no clue as to the rights of an aggrieved
party whose charge has been determined to be without merit by the EEOC.
45 Berg, supra note 41, at 655.
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A complainant has an absolute right to go into court, and this
provision does not affect that right at all.46
It seems, then, that the determination of the EEOC as to the validity of the
charge was not intended to be legally binding. Another district court has stated:
It seems clear . . . that the requirement of resort to the Commission was
designed to give a discriminator opportunity to respond to persuasion
rather than coercion, to soft words rather than the big stick of injunction;
that the requirement was not designed to serve as a screen to prevent
frivolous complaints from reaching the courts.47
Under title VH, therefore, an aggrieved party can bring an action in a
federal court upon the EEOC's determination that his charge is not valid, or,
if his charge is found valid, upon the EEOC's failure at the end of sixty days
to eliminate the discrimination through methods of conciliation. It is only after
this extensive amount of time and procedure that the plaintiff arrives at the
point that he could have immediately reached under section 1983. Of course,
there is the possibility that the conciliatory effort might have ended the discrimi-
nation and abolished the need for court action, but such an occurrence seems
to be the exception rather than the rule.4" Moreover, since any action taken
under title VII would have been against the union or the contractors,49 the
completeness of the relief granted would have been significantly less than that
afforded by section 1983.
Although not mentioned by the Ethridge court, the granting of equitable
relief under section 1983, in lieu of the available state statutory remedy, does
not seem to violate any rules on pre-emption. As one writer recently noted,
the availability of section 1983, independent of any existing state remedies, has
been made clear by the Supreme Court.
[Tihe question as to whether section 1983 provided a remedy in the federal
courts when a state remedy was available remained unanswered for over
70 years.... The federal nature of the rights protected under this section
would seem to indicate that the federal courts were a more appropriate
46 110 CONG. REc. 14191 '(1964) (remarks of Senator Javits).
47 Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 188 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
48 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), established under
title VII, has been in operation since June, 1965. The record is clear; its impact
on employment discrimination has been negligible. . . . There is no basis
for hope that this disheartening situation will improve with time. The defects and
shortcomings of title VII are now manifest and should be corrected by Congress
at the earliest opportunity. The present EEOC is hopelessly mired in a complaint-
based system of enforcement; it has insufficient investigative powers and resources;
its limited enforcement powers are complicated and ineffective; it has no legal or
administrative ability to undertake manpower development or economic opportunity
programs that will support its enforcement activities. Notre Dame Conference on
Federal Civil Rights Legislation and Administration: A Report, 41 NoTPRE DAME
LAWYER 906, 918-19 (1966).
49 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a), (1964) lists only employers, employment agencies, and
labor organizations as parties who may be charged with unlawful employment practices under
title VII.
50 Note, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Civil Remedy - Its Circumvention and Emasculation,
12 How. L.J. 285, 286-87 (1966).
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forum for their enforcement. Finally . . . the Supreme Court resolved
this discrepancy by holding [in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)] that
federal jurisdiction existed independently of the existence of any state
remedies, statutory or otherwise.50
Indeed, this availability was also made explicit by the Supreme Court in
McNeese v. Board of Education5 wherein the Court stated:
The purposes [of section 1983] were severalfold - to override certain
kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate,
"to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate
in theory, was not available in practice", and to provide a remedy in the
federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have.
52
Judge Kinneary's cognizance that the plaintiffs were entitled to a speedy
and certain relief marks the initiation of a judicial power play against discrimina-
tion in employment. By this decision, the court has exerted definite pressure
against the state officials. The defendants' obedience to the injunction will
exert the pressure of economic survival on the contractors, who will in turn
be forced to exert a similar pressure on the unions. The logical result will be
an end to racial discrimination, not only on the Project, but on all other state
construction sites as well. Through his decision, Judge Kinneary demonstrated
an awareness of the enormity of the influence that government contracts can
bring to bear on private employment policies. This influence has previously
been noted.
[T]he correlation of government contract powers with equal employment
opportunities constitutes an underlining of public policy, which is of extreme
importance because it is so readily understandable. The fact that the gov-
ernment is prepared to give notice of its policy to all affected groups and
persons and to the general public by presenting the possibility of such
action as contract cancellation, termination or suspension and a declaration
of ineligibility for future contracts, makes pointed and real, to at least
a certain number of individuals and groups, a set of rights and duties
which were formerly largely diffuse and academic.5" (Emphasis added.)
Since its enactment, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been
limited in its effectiveness by the absence of a forceful sanction for its violation.
Hopefully, the Ethridge decision will serve notice on Congress that effective civil
rights legislation is not yet a reality.
John A. Macleod
51 373 U.S. 668 '(1963).
52 Id. at 671-72. Accord, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961); Powell v. Work-
men's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1964); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450,
456 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964); Madera v. Board of Education, 267
F. Supp. 356, 363-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).




ANTITRUST LAw - SELLER'S REFUSAL To DEAL AND CANCELLATION OF
BUYER'S LEASE BECAUSE BUYER WOULD NOT AGREE ON A MAXIMUM PRICE
Is NOT VIOLATIVE OF SECTION I OF THE SHERMAN ACT. - In November,
1962, Mobil Oil Company and Robert Quinn executed a retail dealer's con-
tract. At the same time, by a separate agreement, Mobil agreed to lease to
Quinn the premises on which he was to operate his dealership. Both agreements
were to be automatically renewed each year, with each party having the right
to terminate upon proper notice. Quinn was successful in the very first year of
operation. However, in November, 1963, Mobil informed Quinn that, if he
did not agree to reduce the price of his gasoline, his rent for the next year would
be substantially increased. Quinn refused to do this, but his lease was ultimately
renewed with only a slight increase in rent. His success continued throughout
the second year. However, shortly thereafter, Mobil began a program of harass-
ment in order to induce Quinn to agree on a maximum price. Instead of sending
Quinn money that it owed him, Mobil sent him a shipment of goods that he
did not order. Also, Quinn's gasoline deliveries were delayed. Finally, when
these pressures failed to produce an agreement, Mobil notified Quinn that it
was cancelling his retail contract and the lease. Quinn vacated the premises
shortly after November of 1964. He then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, charging that Mobil had restrained
trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act by cancelling the lease and
the contract. Quinn sought $30,000 in damages.: The complaint alleged the
above facts, but failed to allege any contract, combination, or conspiracy by
Mobil to fix a maximum resale price. The district court dismissed Quinn's
amended complaint because it failed to allege a federal antitrust violation.
In affirming the decision of the district court, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, by a divided court, held: a unilateral' refusal to
deal and a cancellation of a buyer's lease by a seller because the buyer does not
agree to fix a maximum price dictated by the seller is not violative of section 1
of the Sherman Act when the complaint fails to allege any contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy by the seller to fix such retail prices. Quinn v. Mobil Oil
Company, 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1967).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract, combi-
nation.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ... "' Notwith-
standing this provision, a seller's right to unilaterally refuse to deal with a buyer
was protected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Colgate & Company.'
In Colgate, the Court reasoned:
The purpose of the Sherman Act is . . . to preserve the right of
1 Brief for Appellee at 2, Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 '(1st Cir. 1967).
2 Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1967) (the district court's dismissal
of the complaint was not reported). Quinn was pro se in the court of appeals and, pre-
sumably, also in the district court. It is possible that this accounts for his failure to allege
a contract, combination, or conspiracy.
3 BLACe's LAw DicTIONARY 1701 (4th ed. 1951) defines unilateral as: "One sidpd;
ex parte; having relation to only one of two or more persons or things."
4 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
5 250 U.S. 300 "(1919).
[Vol. 43: 253]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
freedom to trade. In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And,
of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which
he will refuse to sell.'
Later Supreme Court cases have considerably narrowed the seller's dis-
cretion. An expressed or implied agreement to set resale prices, made between
a manufacturer and the jobbers and retailers whom he supplies, has been held
violative of section 1 of the Act.' Furthermore, section 1 is violated where the
seller receives cooperation from wholesalers in regard to sales to retailers who
do not observe the seller's price policy.'
Finally, in 1960, the landmark case of United States v. Parke, Davis &
Company9 was decided. Parke Davis was engaged in a program of preventing
retailers, through refusals to deal, from cutting prices on Parke Davis products.
Company representatives called on wholesalers and retailers to explain the
company policy. The names of those retailers not cooperating with this policy
were furnished to the wholesalers who, in turn, refused to sell to them. In finding
the company guilty of a section 1 violation, the Supreme Court held:
So long as Colgate is not overruled, this result [the economic effect of
sellers refusing to deal with price cutters] is tolerated but only when it is
the consequence of a mere refusal to sell in the exercise of the manufacturer's
right "freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal." When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond
mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he
employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices . . . he
has put together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act.'0
(Emphasis added.)
This opinion clearly limits the seller's privilege to deal with whom he pleases.
In fact, Justice Harlan, dissenting in Parke Davis, felt that the majority opinion
in effect overruled Colgate.1
Along with this historical development, the court in Quinn had to con-
6 Id. at 307.
7 United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920).
8 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
9 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
10 Id. at 44. The Court in Parke Davis implied that, if a state fair trade law had been
in existence, the Sherman Act would not have been violated. Id. at 31 & n.2. It has been
further noted:
The state fair trade laws exempt from the prohibitions of their common law
and antitrust laws specified resale price maintenance contracts or agreements. In
general, the state fair trade laws provide that no contract relating to the resale
of a commodity which bears the trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer of
such commodity and which commodity is in free (fair) and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others shall be
deemed in violation of any law of the state by reason of specified provisions which
may be contained in such contract. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 6,017, at 9033 (1967).
While fair trade laws have been enacted in 42 states, such laws have been declared uncon-
stitutional, in whole or in part, in 23 of these states. Id. at 1 6,041, at 9087-88.
Section 2 of the McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964) grants immunity from federal
antitrust law violations to transactions carried out under state fair trade laws.
11 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 49 '(1960) (dissenting opinion).
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sider three recent decisions that involved a buyer who had been cut off because
he refused to abide by the seller's price policy. Simpson v. Union Oil CompanyP
dealt with a gasoline retailer who had been cancelled because he did not keep
an agreement with the Union Oil Company to set a specific price. There was
evidence that Union Oil had been using consignment agreements in many
retail outlets for a similar purpose. The Supreme Court struck down Union's
system and said:
If the "consignment" agreement achieves resale price maintenance in
violation of the Sherman Act, it and the lease are being used to injure
interstate commerce by depriving independent dealers of the exercise of
free judgment whether to become consignees at all, or remain consignees,
and, in any event, to sell at competitive prices.
13
In a recent case from the Fifth Circuit, Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil
Company,4 Mobil had a retailer's contract and a lease with the operator. The
company successfully pressured Broussard into entering an agreement to fix
maximum prices, but after the dealer had lost profits under the agreement, he
broke it. When Mobil could not persuade him to reinstate the contract, it can-
celled his contract and lease. There was evidence that Mobil had a similar
agreement with one other dealer. 5 The court found that this refusal to deal
by Mobil violated section 1.
The Supreme Court considered the problem of maximum price agreements
in Kiefer-Stewart Company v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons2 In this case, two
liquor companies that held themselves out as competitors agreed to sell only to
those buyers who observed a maximum price. Since the plaintiff did not adhere
to these prices, the companies refused to sell to it. In holding that this refusal
to deal violated section 1, the Court stressed that maximum price agreements
between competitors "no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the
freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with
their own judgment."'
Attempting to read these three cases together, the judges in Quinn reached
results that required three separate opinions. Judge McEntee, who wrote the
opinion of the court, felt that the plaintiff's failure to allege a contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy was a fatal defect and affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the suit on that ground.
Hence, it is not the actual decision in Quinn that gives the case its sig-
nificance. Rather, it is the concurring opinion of Judge Coffin and the dissenting
opinion of Chief Judge Aldrich, both of whom discussed Quinn's claim on its
merits, that clearly illustrate the diverse and conflicting concepts that may be
drawn from the above discussed case law.
Judge Coffin began by stating that Quinn's complaint should have been
12 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
13 Id. at 16.
14 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965).
15 Id. at 349.
16 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
17 Id. at 213.
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dismissed even if it had contained an allegation of contract, combination, or
conspiracy. He dealt first with the fact that the attempted price fixing was
aimed at a maximum price. He argued, "admittedly without the benefit of
authority,"' 8 that the anti-competitive effects of maximum price fixing were
different from the anti-competitive effects of minimum price fixing and, there-
fore, the fixing of maximum prices should not be proscribed by the antitrust
laws. Judge Coffin distinguished Kiefer-Stewart by noting that it involved an
agreement between competitors. He noted that the Court in Kiefer-Stewart
rejected, on the basis of the separate corporate entities of the defendants, a
contention that because of common ownership the two companies were only
instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandising unit and, therefore,
could not conspire to violate the act. He felt that the implication of this rejection
was that an agreement to set maximum prices made by a single manufacturing-
merchandising unit would not violate the antitrust laws.'9 He felt that
Broussard was wrongly decided since it involved such a single manufacturing-
merchandising unit setting a maximum price. Judge Coffin admitted that it
was possible to read Simpson as "proscribing a price fixing agreement between
a single supplier and a single retailer."2 However, he distinguished Simpson
from Quinn on two grounds: (1) the oil company in Simpson was using the same
device with over 3,000 other dealers whereas in the instant case there was no
evidence that Mobil had taken any action with other retailers; (2) the contract
in Simpson was to set a specific price, whereas here it was to set a maximum
price.2' Since Judge Coffin felt that a maximum price agreement permits a
dealer to meet competitive prices and a specific price agreement takes away
this freedom, he concluded that the Simpson rule should not apply to this case.
Chief Judge Aldrich, in dissent, seemingly was not disturbed by the fact
that Quinn's complaint failed to allege the formal requirements of a section 1
violation. In comparing the instant case to Broussard, he noted that at one
time Broussard had entered into an agreement with Mobil to fix a maximum
price, while Quinn had refused to do so. He refused to distinguish the cases
on this ground.
• . . I see no difference in substance between pressure to induce the making
of an unlawful agreement and pressure to reinstate one that has been
broken. To the extent that it be suggested that the rejected agreement in
Broussard is what brought the case within the act, this would not only
be an unfortunate distinction, since any future "Quinn" could establish
rights for himself simply by making the requested agreement one day and
breaking it the next, but also, it seems to me, an illogical one.2 (Emphasis
added.)
In relying on the proscription of maximum price agreements in Kiefer-
Stewart, the dissenting judge noted that the Court did find there an actual
18 Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273, 276 (1st Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion).
19 Id. at 277.
20 Id. at 278.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 279 (dissenting opinion).
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horizontal agreement" to fix a maximum price. But, relying on Simpson, he
argued that the presence of only one manufacturer was irrelevant.
Simpson thus seems to me to hold that a coercively extracted vertical agree-
ment[41 depriving a retailer of pricing discretion violates the act, and hence
that where the requisite coercion to procure the vertical agreement is
shown, a horizontal conspiracy such as that alleged in Kiefer-Stewart is
unnecessary.2 s
Next, the Chief Judge raised a point which, though not relevant to the
existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy, does bear on the philosophy
behind the Colgate doctrine. As discussed above, the rationale of the Colgate
rule is that a seller is free to deal with whom he chooses; if a buyer is cut off
by a seller, he is free to take up relations with another seller. However, as Chief
Judge Aldrich pointed out, this argument breaks down when applied to the
instant case since not only is Mobil a seller to Quinn, it is also his landlord.26
When it refused to deal with Quinn, it not only cut off his source of supply,
it effectively drove him out of business. He could not immediately turn to
another seller.27
Hence, Chief Judge Aldrich read Kiefer-Stewart and Simpson together
as declaring that coercively extracted vertical agreements to fix maximum prices
are illegal. He added that no distinction should be made between temporarily
successful coercive measures, as in Broussard, and those that are totally unsuc-
cessful, as in the instant case.2"
In light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the purpose of the
Sherman Act is to "preserve the right of freedom to trade,"2 Chief Judge
Aldrich's "substance over form" approach merits serious consideration. Admit-
tedly, there is not the slightest hint that Mobil acted in concert with anyone.
However, as Chief Judge Aldrich pointed out, Simpson can be read as pro-
scribing a price fixing agreement between one seller and one buyer.30
Even before Parke Davis was decided, it had been suggested that, in an
attempt to avoid the Colgate doctrine, courts were striving to find any kind of
activity that could constitute a combination or conspiracy when the seller had
23 BLci's LAw DICTIONARY 870 (4th ed. 1951) defines horizontal price fixing contracts
as: "Contracts between producers or between wholesalers or between retailers as to sale or
resale prices."
24 Id. at 1733 defines a vertical price fixing contract:
A contract between producers and wholesalers or distributors, between producers
and retailers, or between wholesalers or distributors and retailers, and not between
producers themselves, between wholesalers themselves, or between retailers them-
selves as to sale or retail prices.
25 Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273, 280 (1st Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
26 Id.
27 Judge Aldrich analogized this situation with that found in Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States 356 U.S. 1 (1958) where the Supreme Court held that a vertical agreement
between a railroad-landowner and a shipper-land purchaser, in which the purchaser agreed,
in partial consideration for the sale of land, to prefer Northern Pacific over the other car-
riers, violated section 1.
28 Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273, 281 (1st Cir. 1967).
29 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
30 Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273, 280 (1st Cir. 1967) '(dissenting opinion).
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refused to deal with a buyer for price fixing reasons. 1 Arguably, this was done
because these situations, whether or not they amounted to combinations or
conspiracies, were violative of the basic policies of the antitrust laws. After
Parke Davis, one court noted that in these days of complex business dealings
it will be very difficult for a seller to stay within the narrow privilege that still
exists and yet effectuate price policies through refusals to deal."2 Applying the
Parke Davis rule to the instant case, it could certainly be said that Mobil's
activities in harassing Quinn and driving him out of business went beyond a
"simple refusal to deal."" But since Mobil had no contract with Quinn, it did
not "effect adherence" as did the seller in Parke Davis. The Supreme Court
has declared, however, that the Sherman Act "is aimed at substance
rather than form."34  This pronouncement has led one commentator to
raise the question whether the non-existence of a contract ought to be enough
to allow a manufacturer to escape the sanctions of the Act which his refusal
to deal would otherwise receive. Relying on Broussard, Chief Judge Aldrich
reasonably answered this question in the affirmative. He noted that if Broussard
is to be distinguished from Quinn on the formal basis that in Broussard there
existed a contract to fix prices and in Quinn no such agreement was completed,
then a buyer who agreed to set a maximum price and the next day broke the
agreement would be protected by the Act, while a buyer who simply refused
to enter into such an agreement would not be. 6
Nor should the fact that Mobil was trying to set a maximum price free
it from liability. As the above discussion of Kiefer-Stewart illustrates, the Su-
preme Court was primarily concerned with the restrictive effects that such
agreements have on businessmen. Though the agreement there was between
competitors, the same rationale should apply in Quinn because, in both cases,
the individual entrepreneur is deprived of his freedom to operate as he deems
best. Admittedly, the additional factor that Mobil was also Quinn's landlord
does not aid the finding of a contract, combination, or conspiracy. Yet it does
show the tremendous leverage a seller in Mobil's position has to control the
market. Such a situation calls for less concern for the letter and more for the
spirit of the Sherman Act. The effect on competition of a seller's action should
depend "on power, not numbers."37
Whether Chief Judge Aldrich's persuasive argument represents only a
momentary departure in the treatment of antitrust problems cannot be certain
at this point. However, the fact that he reached his opinion by interpreting
recent case law may signify that in deciding refusal to deal cases courts have
begun to deal with the realities of the market place.
Thomas J. McCusker
31 Note, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1128-29
(1949).
32 George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir.
1960).
33 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
34 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947).
35 Barber, Refusals To Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
847, 880 (1955).
36 Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273, 279 *(1st Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
37 Note, supra, note 31, at 1124.
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ADMIRALTY - PALLET HELD TO BE A "PACKAGE" FOR PURPOSES OF
LIMrrATION Or CARRIER'S LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 4(5) OF THE CARRIAGE
OF GOODS BY SEA ACT. - I.T.T. Export Corporation [I.T.T.] made up a ship-
ment of 2,160 television tuners in 'New York for Standard Electrica, S.A. [Stan-
dard], a Brazilian corporation. The tuners were boxed in fifty-four cartons,
each carton containing forty tuners. I.T.T. then put these cartons on nine
separate pallets, each pallet containing six cartons. These pallets consisted of
wooden skids, upon which six cartons were stacked in three tiers of two cartons,
covered by a wooden top deck, the whole load being banded together with 1 -
inch steel straps. I.T.T. then engaged Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschif-
fahrts-Gesellschaft [Hamburg] as carrier. Hamburg arranged for the pallets
to be transported to Brazil on the Jytte Skou, a Danish vessel on time charter
to Hamburg.' When I.T.T. delivered the shipment t6 the New York City dock
where the Jytte Skou was loading, Hamburg delivered a dock receipt to I.T.T.
This receipt showed under the column "No. of Pkg." the figure "9." The dock
receipt also recited a standard clause informing the shipper that he was obliged
to declare the value of the goods in his shipment in accordance with the pro-
visions of the yet to be issued bill of lading.
In due course, Hamburg issued a bill of lading on the shipment to I.T.T.
It showed the shipment under the column "No. of Pkg." as "9 pallets." In
addition, clause 24 of the bill of lading recited a standard clause derived from
section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936 [COGSA]: 2
In the event of any loss, damage or delay to or in connection with
goods exceeding in actual value $500 per package lawful money of the
United States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary
freight unit . . . the carrier's liability, if any, shall be determined on the
basis of a value of $500 per package or per customary freight unit, unless
... a higher value shall be declared by the shipper n writing ... . (Empha-
sis added.)
In addition, Hamburg included in clause 24 of the bill of lading the following
definition of "package": "It is agreed that the meaning of the word 'package'
includes pieces and all articles of any description except goods shipped in bulk."4
I.T.T. did not exercise its option to declare its shipment at a value in excess of
$500 per package.
I.T.T. routinely transferred the bill of lading to Standard. When the
Jytte Skou unloaded her cargo at Rio de Janeiro, Hamburg discovered that
seven pallets of television tuners had been stolen, en route from the United States,
by parties unknown.5 The estimated value of the 1,680 missing tuners was
1 Letter from Wharton Poore to Thomas J. Reed, August 31, 1967, on file with the
NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
2 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1964).
3 Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Columbus Lines, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 343, 344-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd sub nom. Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschif-
fahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3079
(U.S. July 24, 1967) (No. 409).
4 Id. at 345.
5 Brief for Appellant at 3, Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische
Dampfschiffahrts-Cesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967).
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$16,800. Standard accepted the two remaining pallets of tuners and wrote a
letter of complaint to Hamburg, stating that only two packages were discharged
out of a shipment of nine packages. In reply, Hamburg's agent described the
lost shipment as "9 Pallets containing 54 cartons of television equipment.... ."
Hamburg offered to settle the claim for the missing tuners for $3,500, calculated
at $500 per pallet of six cartons. Standard refused this offer and filed a libel in
rem and in personam before the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.
In the district court, the facts set out above were stipulated, and the sole
issue presented was whether a pallet, holding six separate enclosed cartons,
consisting of a deck beneath the load, a deck atop the load, held together with
ly 2 -inch steel bands, the sides open to the carrier's inspection, could be held to
be one "package" within the meaning of section 4(5) of the COGSA which
provides:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become
liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation
of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package lawful money of the
United States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary
freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other currency, unless the
nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before
shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. This declaration, if embodied
in the bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be con-
clusive on the carrier.. .. 7 (Emphasis added.)
Notwithstanding Standard's argument that the pallets were made up solely
for loading and shipping convenience, the trial court held the pallets to be
"packages" within the meaning of section 4(5) of the COGSA.8 Standard
accepted the tendered $3,500 without prejudice and appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That court, one judge dis-
senting, affirmed and held: a pallet is a "package" within the meaning of sec-
tion 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936. Standard Electrica,
S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d
943 (2d Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. July 24,
1967) (No. 409).
The COGSA embodies the Hague Rules governing ocean bills of lading.
It applies to bills of lading on below decks shipments in international commerce
inbound and outbound from United States ports. It may also be incorporated
by reference in the bill of lading to cover cargo shipped between ports in the
United States, and cargo shipped on-deck.
The Hague Rules themselves were first drafted at a meeting of the Inter-
national Law Association held at the Hague in August, 1921.' The Rules were
6 Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Columbus Lines, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 343, 345 '(S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd sub nom. Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschif-
fahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967).
7 49 Stat. 1211 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1964).
8 Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Columbus Lines, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 343, 345 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd sub nom. Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschif-
fahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967).
9 H.R. REPy. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
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then laid before the International Maritime Conference held in Brussels in
October, 1922, but work on the Rules was not concluded until the following
year. ° In 1924, before the Brussels Convention was officially opened for signa-
ture, the English passed their own Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which incor-
porated most of the provisions of the Hague Rules. 1 The United States sent
representatives to Brussels, and the Convention was signed for the United States
by the American ambassador to Belgium in June, 1925.2 However, the Con-
vention was not ratified by the Senate until 1935.'s A year later, legislation
(COGSA) was enacted by Congress to replace the Harter Act of 1893. "'
The primary purpose for establishing the Hague Rules was to regularize
the terms contained in ocean bills of lading."5 Secondarily, the Rules sought to
limit the warranty of seaworthiness as applied to cargo in general maritime
law,'" and to raise the limitation on a carrier's liability for lost, stolen, damaged,
or destroyed cargo to £ 100 "per package or unit," absent a declaration of higher
valuation by the shipper.' When the United States finally adopted the Hague
Rules, the Senate reserved the right to amend article IV, section 5 of the Rules
to read "$500 .... per package or unit."'"
The French draft of the Brussels Convention, which the United States
State Department translated before adoption, antedated the English Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act of 1924. This may explain why the State Department
translation of the French draft followed the wording of the English statute. It
translated "par colis ou unit6," appearing in article IV, section 5 of the French
draft, as "per package or unit."' 9 Actually, the word "colis" has three primary
10 Id. at 4, 5.
11 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22 (1924).
12 H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 '(1936).
13 79 CONG. REc. 4758 (1935).
14 80 CONG. REG. 5609 (1936).
15 This point is mentioned in the preamble to the Brussels Convention as it appears in
79 CONG. Rac. 4754 (1935). See also S. REP. No. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) passim;
H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5 (1936); 79 CONG. R ac. 4757 (1935) (remarks
of Senator Thomas of Utah).
16 See 46 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1964).
17 79 CONG. Rac. 4757 (1935) where Senator Thomas stated:
The convention will do more, however, than produce international uniformity
In particular, a shipper will be allowed 1 year within which to bring suit
for damages to his cargo (instead of the very short period which now appears in
most bills of lading), and carriers who have received goods sound and have delivered
them damaged will be required to pay for that damage unless they prove that there
has been no negligence on their part. Carriers also will not be allowed to limit
their liability below $500 per package.
18 The text of the reservation is as follows:
That notwithstanding the provisions of article 4, section 5, and the first para-
graph of article 9 of the convention, neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any
event be or become liable within the jurisdiction of the United States of America
for any loss or damage to or in connection with goods in an amount exceeding
$500, lawful money of the United States of America, per package or unit unless
the nature and value of goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment
and inserted in the bill of lading. Id.
19 The French text of the Brussels Convention is set out parallel to the State Department
translation in 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1344-59 (Hudson ed. 1931). The French
version of article IV, § 5 reads as follows:
Le transporteur comme le navire ne seront tenus en aucun cas des pertes ou
dommages causes aux marchandises ou les concernant pour une somme d~passant
100 liv. sterl. par colis ou uniti, ou l'6quivalent de cette somme en une autre
monnale ? moins que la nature et la valeur de ces marchandises n' aient 6t6
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English equivalents: package, parcel, or case."0 Consequently, the original draft
of the convention used an ambiguous word to define the unit of cargo to which
the £ 100 limitation of liability attached. The resulting rendition of "colis" as
"package" hardly clarified the unit to which the limitation is attached. In
enacting the COGSA, Congress attempted to clear up some of the ambiguity
in section 4(5) of the Hague Rules by replacing the word "unit" with "cus-
tomary freight unit,"21 but the word "package" was left without further clari-
fication.
The ambiguity of section 4(5) has led the courts to reach many confusing,
and at times, even astounding results. An uncrated truck has been held to be
a "package" for purposes of the limitation of liability under section 4(5),'
as has a yacht shipped above deck under a bill of lading incorporating section
4(5) by reference.2" A giant amusement crane, shipped in 126 uncrated parts,
has been evaluated as either 126 "packages" or 126 "customary freight units"
for purposes of determining the carrier's liability.24 A freezer trailer load of
fish was determined to be a "package."' 5 On the other hand, a partially enclosed
tractor was held not to be a "package. ' 28 A locomotive and tender, shipped
as is, was held to be one "customary freight unit," rather than one "package."27
"Customary freight unit" has consistently been construed to mean the unit of
quantity, weight, or measurement customarily used to compute the freight
charges on the goods shipped. 2' As a rule, this alternate method of evaluating
liability is ordinarily only used upon a determination that the article in question
is not a "package."
29
The judicial gloss placed upon the word "package" since COGSA's pas-
sage in 1936, has had the net effect of emptying "package" of any content it
may once have had as a term of the shipping trade. This situation has been
compounded by the introduction of automated cargo handling techniques and
new containerized cargo units. The ubiquitous and labor-saving pallet, which
gave rise to the dispute in Standard Electrica, is now used to speed up dock-
side and shipboard handling of small-sized boxes, cartons, and cases.
d~claries par le chargeur avant leur embarquement et que cette declaration ait
dtd ins&r~e au connaissement. Id. at 1352-53 (emphasis added).
20 CASSELL'S NEw FRENCH DICTIONARY 165 (5th ed. 1951).
21 See 79 CONG. REQc. 13342 (1935).
22 The Margaret Lykes, 57 F. Supp. 466, 471 (E.D. La. 1944). Accord, Anticosti Ship-
ping Co. v. St. Amand, 19 D.L.R.2d 472 (1959); But cf. Studebaker Distrib., Ltd. v. Charl-
ton Steam Shipping Co., [1938] 1 K.B. 459, 467 (1937) (sixty unboxed automobiles held
not to be packages).
23 Pannell v. United States Lines Co., 263 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
1013 (1959).
24 Stirnimann v. The San Diego, 148 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1945).
25 United Purveyors, Inc. v. Motor Vessel New Yorkers, 250 F. Supp. 102, 106 (S.D.
Fla. 1965) (dictum).
26 Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
27 Petition of Isbrandtsen, 201 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1953).
28 Id.; The Bill, 55 F. Supp. 780, 783 (D. Md. 1944). See generally Case Note, "Units"
and "Customary Freight Units" in the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 22 MOD. L. Rav. 550 (1959).
29 See, e.g., Gulf Italia Co. v. The Exiria, 160 F. Supp. 956 (1958), aff'd sub nom.




On the basis of the above discussed case law, it is not surprising that the
court in Standard Electrica failed to reach a unanimous decision on whether a
pallet is a "package." Chief Judge Lumbard began the majority opinion by
declaring that the overriding purpose of the COGSA was "the avoidance of
adhesion contracts, providing protection for the shipper against the inequality
in bargaining power."" He found no meaningful legislative history to help the
court determine what Congress meant by the term "package" in 1936.
Only certain general observations may be made as to the reason why
"package" was selected as an appropriate unit upon which the limitation
of liability was placed in our 1936 Act .... No doubt the drafters had
in mind a unit that would be fairly uniform and predictable in size .... 31
The majority admitted that the drafters of the COGSA could not have fore-
seen the alteration in cargo handling techniques that led to the use of palletized
cargo and containerized shipping units. 2 In addition, the court found that "no
court has yet considered how the limitation of liability is to be construed in
light of this technological change."33 However, the majority could not bring
themselves to accept Standard's contention that, since a pallet is merely a unit
of convenience to expedite handling, it should not be considered a "package."
The court found that "[e]ach pallet had the physical characteristics of a pack-
age and was clearly a 'bundle put up for transportation.' ,
The majority was also impressed by the fact that the shipper, rather than
the carrier, chose to make up the cargo on pallets."3 Judge Lumbard placed
great weight on the parties' shipping documents, noting that under the terms
of the bill of lading the shipper could have placed a higher value on each pallet.
He reasoned that this option offers a shipper ample opportunity to protect his
interest in the cargo 6 Finally, the majority concluded that any effect the
changes in shipping techniques and cargo handling should have on the language
of section 4(5) is proper for congressional rather than judicial determination.
If through the passage of time this statutory limitation [section 4(5)] has
become inadequate and its application inequitable, a revision must come
from Congress, it should not come from the courts.
We are mindful that any other decision would only contribute to con-
fusion as to the meaning of the word "package" as used in § 4(5) .. .and
would place upon the carrier the burden of looking beyond the informa-
tion in the bill of lading or beyond the outer packing to investigate the
contents of each shipment.3 7
Judge Feinberg, in dissent, declared that the original purpose of the
COGSA was to raise the minimum liability limitations in bills of lading and
30 Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft,
375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1967).
31 Id. at 945.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 946.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 946-47.
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"to protect cargo interests like appellant.""8 He inferred that the statute must
be construed so as to protect shippers, rather than carriers.8 9 He asserted that
a modern and fair characterization of "package" was set out in Mitsubishi
International Corporation v. S.S. Palmetto State.40 In Mitsubishi, another panel
of the Second Circuit held that the article in question, a thirty-two ton roll of
sheet steel, was a "package" because it was completely enclosed in a wooden
box. Applying the "completely enclosed" criteria, the dissenting judge naturally
found that the open-ended pallets in Standard Electrica could not be packages.
I would normally expect a package at least to completely enclose the
goods in question. Here, the tuners were completely enclosed in cartons
-each carton was obviously a package. Strapping six cartons together
on a platform with a board on top .. .did not make a package out of
the six cartons .... 41 (Emphasis added.)
In concluding, Judge Feinberg found irrelevant the fact that it was the shipper
who chose to put up his cargo in pallets and that he had the option to declare
his cargo's true value. 2
Clearly, the majority's opinion does nothing to clarify the meaning of
"package" in section 4(5) of the COGSA. In stressing the fact that Standard
was free to raise the $500 limit, the majority, in effect, begs the question;
namely, how is a shipper to decide whether his goods are sufficiently protected
by section 4(5) in the absence of a clear definition of "package." The increased
tariff rates that would attach to any higher valuation of the goods by the shipper
mitigates the idea that shippers should "play it safe" whenever a doubtful
situation arises.
Also, some consideration should be given to the effect that Standard
Electrica and similar decisions could have on American merchant shipping as
a whole. Standard Electrica stands as clear warning to shippers that the courts
will shift the risk of loss on palletized cargo to the shipper and his underwriter.
With no efficient recourse available against the carrier, insurers are bound to
raise their rates on palletized cargo. In an attempt to avoid these consequences,
shippers may well revert to bringing their cargo down to the docks in small,
inconvenient cartons and parcels that will be adequately protected by section
4(5). As a result, the modem, automated, labor-saving loading devices, designed
to expedite the handling of goods put up in pallets or other large containers,
would be of no avail. Already, the wages attained for sailors and longshoremen
by the National Maritime Union and the Independent Longshoremen's Union
have had a serious effect on the United States shipping industry." Because the
majority of both United States and foreign flag carriers operate under an inter-
38 Id. at 947 (dissenting opinion).
39 Id. (dissenting opinion).
40 311 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 922 (1963).
41 Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft,
375 F.2d 943, 947-48 (2d Cir. 1967) '(dissenting opinion).
42 Id. at 948.
43 See The Troubled Waters in Shipping, DUN'S REv. & MODERN INDUS., June, 1965,
at 226, 230, 232. The inference from this discussion of union featherbedding and related
attempts to overstaff ships and docks presented in this article is quite clear-the NMU and
ILA are killing their industry.
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national cartel system in which most freight rates are fixed," high rising labor
costs prevent United States carriers from attaining a profit margin near that
of their foreign competitors. To keep the high cost of American labor from
eliminating any hope of profit, United States -carriers have necessarily turned
to all the modem means of automated cargo handling available. But these
devices can only be used successfully if shippers prepare their cargo in pallets
or other large shipping units. Hence, by discouraging such action on the part
of shippers, the decision in Standard Electrica only adds to the already perilous
plight of American merchant shipping.
As a judicial solution to these problems, the Mitsubishi criterion championed
by Judge Feinberg has some appeal. If the application of "package" is restricted
to "an article completely enclosed" in some container,4" shippers, carriers, and
underwriters will be better able to evaluate their relative positions under section
4(5) and adjust their insurance plans accordingly. The one unfortunate aspect
of the holding in Mitsubishi is that if a "package" means a "fully enclosed
article," then all forms of containerized cargo units would seem to fall within
the $500 per package limitation of liability. Hence, the burden of loss for a
freezer trailer or other containerized goods would remain on the shipper.
Perhaps, a better method of dealing with the "package" problem is that
suggested in Gulf Italia Company v. The Exiria." In this case, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that a partially enclosed
tractor could not be a "package" under section 4(5) of the COGSA. In
reaching their decision, the court in Gulf Italia pointed out that "[a] large trac-
tor, weighing 43,319 pounds, is not within the purview of the layman's view
of a 'package.' "" The court rationally concluded that under such circum-
stances Congress could not have intended that the carrier be able to limit its
liability "to a pittance of only $500." The court then proceeded to evaluate
the shipper's loss in terms of the "customary freight unit" used to bill the shipper
for the trip.-9 Applying this common-sense approach to the situation presented
in Standard Electrica, the meaning of "package" in section 4(5) should not
be extended to include the whole pallet and would, therefore, be confined to the
six cartons that comprised the pallet. This position is logical. Attempts to
extend "package" beyond the original comprehension of the term defeat any
hope of the uniformity that the Hague Rules sought to achieve.
Of course, the best answer to the problems brought about by the increased
size of modern cargo units would be a complete revision of section 4(5). Ap-
parently, the majority was unaware of the international nature of the COGSA
since it called for congressional revision of section 4(5)." This course would
44 For a general discussion of the cartel system, see Warring Ship Lines Fight Cartels,
BusmEss WEEK, Oct. 13, 1962, at 83-87.
45 Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. S.S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 922 (1963).
46 160 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Gulf Italia Co. v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
47 Id. at 959.
48 Id.
49 The district court found 34.6 shipping units, apparently 40 cubic feet each. Id. at 960.
50 Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft,
375 F.2d 943, 946-47 (2d Cir. 1967).
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not be wise without a corresponding international adjustment of the standards
for limiting liability in the Hague Rules themselves. Otherwise, the primary
purpose of the Hague Rules - increased uniformity in ocean bills of lading -
would be defeated. No doubt any change in the treaty would be a task for
shippers, carriers, underwriters, bankers and diplomats. Nevertheless, the fol-
lowing schedule for limiting a carrier's liability is suggested.
CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILrrY FOR GOODS
In the event of loss, damage or delay in delivery of goods for which a carrier
is liable, the following evaluations of the limitations of the carrier's liability shall
apply, unless the shipper shall declare in writing the actual value of the goods
shipped, and deliver his declaration to the carrier before the goods are shipped, to
be attached to the bill of lading as prima facie evidence of the value of such goods.
(a) Any goods shipped by case, crate, barrel, bag, or other fully enclosed
cargo unit less than 40 cubic feet shall be evaluated at a maximum of $500 per unit.
(b) Any goods shipped by case, crate, barrel, bag or other fully enclosed
cargo unit exceeding 40 cubic feet shall be evaluated at a maximum of $2,500
per unit.
(c) Any goods shipped by a pallet which exceeds 40 cubic feet shall be evaluated
at a maximum of $2,500 per pallet.
(d) Goods shipped in bulk shall be evaluated at the rate of $500 per unit
of quantity, weight or measurement used in the computation of the freight rate
charged for shipping the goods.
(e) Any goods shipped that are not classifiable under subsections (a) through
(d) above shall be evaluated at the rate of $500 per unit of quantity, weight or
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